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FUENTES v. SHEVIN: NEW PROCEDURAL
SAFEGUARDS FOR THE BUYER UNDER
CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACTS
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state "shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law." In recent
years, the problem of applying this right to everyday commercial transactions involving conditional sales contracts has constantly been before the courts.1 Particularly, the problem has
concerned the rights of both the seller and buyer under a conditional sales contract in the event of a default by the buyer.
Typically, when a vendee of a conditional sales contract defaults, the vendor will attempt to repossess the goods by replevin, necessarily raising certain questions. Can he do so
summarily, without a hearing and without giving the vendee
adequate notice? Will this procedure violate due process and
wrongfully deprive the vendee of his "property" between the
time of the vendor's repossession and the final judgment of the
2
court? What effect will the replevin statutes of the state,
1 Some of the more important cases on this topic will be discussed later
in this article.
2 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 119, §§1-27 (1971)
is the replevin statute in Illinois.
The following jurisdictions permit prejudgment recovery of chat-

tels: ALA. CODE tit. 9, §§93-97 (1959); ALAS. R. Civ. P. §88 (1968);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§12-1301 to -1302 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN.

§§34-2101 to -2104 (1962)

CAL CODE CIV. P. §§509-12 (West 1967);

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §152-515 to -531 (1960); D.C. CODE ENCYCL.
ANN. §16-3701 (1966); IDAHO CODE §§8-301 to -312 (1948) ; IND. ANN.
STAT. §§3-2701 to -2713 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. §643.10 (1950);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §60-1005 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. §425.120 (1972);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.

14, §7301 (1965);

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.

247, §7 (1959); MICH. STAT. ANN. §27A7309 (1962); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§565.01 (1947); MISS. CODE ANN. §2841 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§533.010 to -. 230 (1965); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §93-4101 (1964);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§25-1093 to 10.110 (1965); NEv. REV. STAT. tit. 3,
§31840 (1971); N.H. REV. STAT. §§536.1 to 536.8 (1955); N.J. REV.
STAT. §2A:59-1 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§22-17-1 to -21 (1954);

N.C.

GEN.

STAT.

§1-472 (1969); N.D.

CENT. CODE

§32-07-01 (1960);

§2737.01 (Anderson 1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, §1571 (1961); ORE. REV. STAT. §29.810 (1969) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. §34-21-1 (1970); S.C. CODE ANN. §10-2501 (1962); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§21-15-1 to -15-8 (1967) ; TENN. CODE ANN. §§23-2301
et seq.; UTAH R. Civ. P. 64B (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §12-5371
(1958); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§7.64.010 to -. 010 (1961) ; WI. STAT.
ANN. §265.01 (1957); WYO. STAT. ANN. CODE CIV. P. §§1-693 to -707
1957); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §211 (1967). Shortly after the decision
in Fuentes the Tennessee replevin statutes, TENN. CODE ANN. §§23-2301
to 2328 were declared unconstitutional insofar as they authorized deprivation of property without the right to a prior opportunity to be heard.
OHIO

REV. CODE

ANN.
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applicable sections of the Uniform Commercial Code, 3 and provisions of the contract 4 have on the vendor if he attempts to
replevy the property? These are some of the questions which
the Supreme Court attempted to answer in the decision of
Fuentes v. Shevin.5
In Fuentes, the Supreme Court reviewed the decisions of
two federal district courts upholding the constitutionality of
the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin laws,0 which authorized
summary seizure by an ex parte application for a writ of replevin. One appellant, Margarita Fuentes, purchased a gas
stove and a stereophonic phonograph under a conditional sales
contract in which title was retained in the vendor until all installments were paid. After a product servicing dispute developed, and with approximately $200 remaining in unpaid installments, the vendor obtained a writ of replevin ordering the
sheriff to seize the disputed goods.7 Shortly thereafter, Mrs.
Fuentes instituted an action in the district court challenging
the constitutionality of the Florida replevin statuteA The appellants in the second case bought a bed and other household
items under a conditional sales installment contract.9 The
vendors obtained and executed summary writs in Pennsylvania
claiming that the defendants had not continued their installment
payments, whereupon the goods were seized by the sheriff.
Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, held that
the Pennsylvania and Florida replevin provisions were invalid
under the fourteenth amendment, since the appellants were deprived of property without precedural due process of law.10
Due process, the Court held, was violated because no opporSee Mitchell v. State, Civil No. 72-241 (W.D. Tenn., Sept. 28, 1972).

3The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE section most important in this regard
is §9-503 which provides:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to
take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party

may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach

of the peace or may proceed by action ....
4Provisions such as an express reservation, by the vendor, to summarily

repossess the chattel on default by the vendee.
5407 U.S. 67 (1972).
0 The first case that the Court reviewed was Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317
F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
the Court was Epps v. Cortese,
7
The factual backgound
Court opinion, 407 U.S. 67,
Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F.

The other case consolidated for review by
326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
reported here is drawn from the Supreme
70-73 (1972), the district court opinion,
Supp. 954, 956 (S.D. Fla. 1970), and a

recent law review article written by two of the attorneys who handled

the case for Mrs. Fuentes, Abbott & Peters, Fuentes v. Shevin: A Narrative of Federal Tax Litigation in the Legal Services Program, 57
IOWA L. REv. 955, 959-63 (1972).
8407 U.S. 67, at 71 (1972).

9Id. at 71.
10 Id. at 96.
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tunity for a hearing was provided for the appellants before
their property was repossessed.,' Under the Constitution, a person whose rights are to be affected is entitled to a hearing at a
meaningful time and manner even if the effect is to be temporary. 1 2 The Court commented that the Florida and Pennsylvania
replevin statutes violated the principles of due process, 3 and
that the requirement that a party first post a bond conclusively
alleging that he is entitled to specific goods was no substitute for
a prior hearing.' 4 Further, the Supreme Court stated that the
possessory interests of these conditional vendees who made
"significant installment payments" were sufficient for them to
invoke due process safeguards despite the fact that title remained in the vendors, 15 and notwithstanding that the deprivation of property might be only temporary. 6 Finally, it was
held that the contract provisions for repossession in the event
of the buyer's default did not amount to a waiver of appellant's
right to due process, since those provisions neither dispensed
with a prior hearing nor indicated the procedure by which repossession was to be achieved.' 7
REPLEVIN AND CONDITIONAL

SALES CONTRACTS

In Fuentes, the sale of the chattels was made under a conditional sales contract. A conditional sale has been defined as
a transaction in which the vendee receives both possession and
the right to use of the goods; however, the transfer of title is dependent upon the full payment of the purchase price.' 8 The
vendee pays the vendor in installments which include a finance
charge; thus, until full payment is made, title remains in the
vendor as security" for payment from the vendee. In Illinois,
11 Id. at 80.
12 Id. at 85.
13 Id. at 83.

Id.
15 Id. at 84.
16 Id. at 85.
14

1'

Id. at 96.

IS Sales, 47 AM. JuR. §828 (1960).
The creditors in Fuentes expressly
reserved title to the goods. The contract read as follows:
Until such payment has been made Buyer agrees that Seller shall retain
title and right of possession of said merchandise; Buyer will not sell,
remove or encumber and shall be responsible for all losses or any damage to said merchandise and in the event of default of any payment or
payments, Seller at its option may take back the merchandise or affirm
the sale and hold Buyer liable for the unpaid balance, including any delinquency or collection charge where permitted by law.
1,9See Frazier v. Allison, 315 Ill. App. 253, 42 N.E.2d 967 (1942)
Edward Thompson Co. v. Collins, 151 Ill. App. 545 (1909) ; Branstetter
Motor Co. v. Silverberg, 140 Ill. App. 451 (1908) ; O'Neil v. Rogers, 110
Ill. App. 622 (1903) ; Gould v. Howell, 32 Ill. App. 349 (1890) ; Fairbanks v.
Malloy, 16 Ill. App. 277 (1885).
For a general discussion of conditional sales and rights of bona fide
purchasers under conditional sales contracts, see R. BROWN, THE LAW OF
PERSONAL PROPERTY §72 (2d ed. 1955).
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this type of installment sales contract is strictly regulated by
20

statute.

Replevin has been the most commonly used method to enforce the seller's rights, 21 although other remedies, such as self
help, have been available. 22 The right of a conditional seller to
summarily repossess property has been held to have arisen at
the inception of the sales contract by reason of the retention
of title, 23 even if there were no stipulations in the contract disclosing such a remedy. 24 Many conditional sales contracts provided that upon default, the vendor could retake the property

without legal process and sell it, without notice, at a public
sale. 25 More recently, section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial
Code has expressly granted the power of self help to the secured
vendor without need for judicial process. 21' However, the issuance
of replevin writs 27 has been the preferable procedure for the
conditional vendor to repossess, since a resort to "self help"
could expose a creditor to possible liability in an action for tres28
pass, conversion, or invasion of privacy.
Replevin is a statutory action in Illinois. 29

The statute,

ch. 121/, §§501-33 (1971).
Note 19 supra.
22 See cases in 32 I.L.P. S(-5: ch. 10, §208 for a brief survey of the
remedies of the seller on default.
23 45 A.L.R. 3d 1233 at 1242.
211

ILL. REV. STAT.

21

24Id.
2-A majority of courts have sustained the validity of these provisions.
Id. at 1244.
26 See the comments of U.C.C. §9-503.
See also note 3 supra.
27 Replevin actions existed as long ago as the late 12th and early 13th
centuries and it has been said to be among the most ancient and well defined
writs known to the common law. H. WELLS, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF
REPLEVIN (2d ed. 1907).
Replevin comes from the word replegiar'e, meaning to take back the
pledge. It was used as a means for redelivering the pledge taken in distress
by the landlord. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 147. Replevin originated as a means of protecting the poor from the arbitrary exercise of power
by the rich, i.e., the lords. J. COBBEY, LAW OF REPLEVIN §1 (2d ed. 1900).
Often, a landlord or other creditor would seek to collect on the rental or debt
owed to him by appropriating without legal process, property of the debtor.
If the debtor objected to this seizure, he was forced to become a plaintiff in
an action to recover the property. Since it was recognized that even this
temporary taking could work an injustice, the debtor was allowed, through
leave of court, to seek a writ of replevin by which, upon receipt of sufficient
security, the court would order the local sheriff to seize the chattels and return them to the plaintiff-debtor until a final determination of the claim
against him. 71 CoLUM. L. REV.887 (1971).
The gist of replevin became that of a wrongful taking while the gravamen of detinue was the wrongful detention of property. 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 147. Contemporary actions of replevin wherein a creditor
seeks to recover goods pursuant to a conditional sales contract resemble the
common law action of debt or detinue rather than replevin. Thus, actions
to regain property lost by a voluntary parting of possession (as in conditional sales contracts) were directed through actions of detinue and not
replevin. 3 W. HOLDSWORTn, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 577.
28 Note 23 supra at 1243.
29 ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 119, §§1-27 (1971).
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similar to that in Fuentes, merely requires the plaintiff to file
a verified complaint in which he states that he is the owner of
the described property and that such property is wrongfully re31
tained by the defendant. 30 A writ is then issued to the sheriff,
who is directed to deliver the property to the plaintiff. 2 The
plaintiff is required to post a bond ;3 however, the defendant
34
may retain possession of the chattel by posting a similar bond.
There is no provision in the statute for a preliminary hearing
to determine probable cause for the repossession. Consequently,
an ex parte application for replevin results in the dispossession
of the chattel from the vendee without a prior hearing to
determine probable cause for the issuance of the replevin
writ. In the event that the vendor wrongfully sues out a writ
of replevin, costs and damages are paid from the posted
bond.35 The issue before the Fuentes Court was whether such
30 Id. at §4.
An action in replevin shall be commenced by the filing of a verified complaint which describes the property to be replevied and states that the
plaintiff in such action is the owner of the property so described, or that
he is then lawfully entitled to the possession thereof, and that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, and that the same has not
been taken for any tax, assessment, or fine levied by virtue of any law
of this State, against the property of such plaintiff, or against him individually, nor seized under any execution or attachment against the goods
and chattels of such plaintiff liable to execution or attachment, nor held
by virtue of any writ of replevin against such plaintiff. The clerk shall
issue the writ of replevin upon request of the plaintiff.
31 Id. at §6.
32 Id. at §7.
The writ of replevin shall require the sheriff, or other officer to whom it
is directed to take the property, describing it as in the complaint, from
the possession of the defendant, and deliver the same to the plaintiff
unless such defendant executes a bond and security as hereinafter provided, and to summon the defendant to answer the plaintiff in the action,
or in case the property or any part thereof is not found and delivered to
the sheriff or other officer, to answer the plaintiff for the value of the
same. The writ of replevin may be served as a summons by any person
authorized to serve writs of summons.
33 Id. at §10.
Before the execution of any writ of replevin the plaintiff or some one
else on his behalf shall give to the sheriff or other officer a bond with
sufficient security in double the value of the property about to be replevied, conditioned that he will prosecute such suit to effect and without delay and make return of the property to the defendant if return of
the property shall be awarded or will deliver the same to the intervening
petitioner should it be found that the property belongs to him, and save
and keep harmless such sheriff or other officer as the case may be, in
made, unless the plaintiff shall, in the meantime, have become entitled to
the possession of the property, when judgment may be given against him
for costs and such damage as the defendant shall have sustained; or if
the property was held for the payment of any money, the judgment may
be in the alternative that the plaintiff pay the amount for which the
same was rightfully held, with proper damages, within a given time, or
make return of the property in case such property has been delivered to
the plaintiff.
'4ld. at §14.
35 Id. at §10.
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statutes as the Illinois replevin statute violated due process.
DUE PROCESS AND SUMMARY REPOSSESSION

Numerous courts have held that common justice and the
fourteenth amendment require that no person shall be deprived
of his property without notice and an opportunity to defend.36
To meet the procedural requirements of due process, sufficient
notice of the pendency of the proceeding must be given to the
defendant along with a reasonable opportunity for him to appear. The hearing, which must precede the taking of the property, cannot be mere form, but must provide an opportunity to
7
defend.3
A new direction against summary proceedings was forged
by the Supreme Court in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corpora-

tion.3 8

In that case, the plaintiff finance corporation, in ac-

cordance with the procedure provided by the Wisconsin stat-

ute,89 instituted a garnishment action.

The defendant was

served with summons and notice of the litigation on the same
day that his wages were frozen, thus depriving him of their use
until adjudication of the suit. The Court held that the freezing
of these wages deprived the defendant of due process, since no
notice or hearing was provided. Noting that wages were a

"specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in

our economic system," the Court reasoned that the deprivation
of wages without opportunity to be heard could present a grave

hardship on the wage earner, since an adequate defense to the
garnishment may exist and never be heard.

However, the

36 See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) ; Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); Postal Teleg-Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S.
464 (1918) ; Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950). See also Newberry Library v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 387 Ill. 85, 55 N.E.2d 147 (1944); Gunnell v. Palmer, 370 Ill. 206,
18 N.E.2d 202 (1938); People v. Lavendowski, 329 Ill. 223, 160 N.E. 582
(1928); Rabbitt v. Frank C. Weber & Co., 297 Ill. 491, 130 N.E. 787 (1921);
Boettcher v. Howard Engraving Co., 389 Ill. 75, 58 N.E.2d 866 (1945);
Walter Cabinet Co. v. Russell, 250 Ill. 416, 95 N.E. 462 (1911).
3 ConstitutionalLaw, 16 AM. JUR. 2d §562; Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398
(1900); Washington ex rel. Oregon R.R. & Navigation Co. v. Fairchild, 224
U.S. 510 (1912); Walker v. Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956) ; Schroeder
v. New York City, 371 U.S. 208 (1962) ; People v. Gale, 339 Ill. 162, 171 N.E.
186 (1939) ; In re Rackliffe's Estate, 366 Ill. 22, 7 N.E.2d 754 (1937) ; Smith
v. Dept. of Registration and Education et al, 412 Ill. 332, 106 N.E.2d 722
(1952).

38395 U.S. 337 (1969).

3) WIs. STAT. §267.18(2) (a) provides:
When wages or salary are the subject of garnishment action, the
garnishee shall pay over to the principal defendant on the date when such
wages or salary would normally be payable a subsistence allowance, out
of the wages or salary then owing in the sum of $25 in the case of an individual without dependents or $40 in the case of an individual with dependents; but in no event in excess of 50 per cent of the wages or salary
owing. Said subsistence allowance shall be applied to the first wages or
salary earned in the period subject to said garnishment action.
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Court did note several extraordinary situations where due
process would be satisfied by the Wisconsin statute. 40 In his
concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan stated that the deprived "property" at issue was the use of the garnished wages
during the garnishment and suit. He reasoned that "due process is afforded only by the kinds of 'notice' and 'hearing' which
are aimed at establishing the ...

probable validity, of the under-

lying claim against the alleged debtor before he can be deprived
of his property or its unrestricted use. ' 1
The Supreme Court continued its attack on summary repossession methods in Goldberg v. Kelly, 42 holding that the
fourteenth amendment requires that welfare recipients be
given an evidentiary hearing before the termination of public
assistance benefits.
Moreover, the Court stated that due
process required timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination of benefits and an effective
opportunity to defend. The opportunity to be heard, it was
said, must be tailored to "the capacities and circumstances of
those who are to be heard.143 The Court reasoned that the
predetermination hearing need not take the form of a trial or
include a record; however, minimal procedural safeguards required an opportunity to retain an attorney at the hearing, confront and cross-examine witnesses, and present oral evidence to
an impartial decision maker whose conclusion must rest solely
on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing. 4"
In March of 1971, the Supreme Court extended the reasoning of Sniadach and Goldberg in the case of Boddie v. Connecticut.45 Here a class action was brought on behalf of all female welfare recipients residing in Connecticut and seeking a
divorce. The Connecticut statute required the payment of
court fees and costs for service of process before a party was
permitted access to the courts.4 6 The Supreme Court held that
due process prohibited a state from denying any individual access to state courts solely because of the inability to pay court
fees, 47 reasoning that due process requires an opportunity to be
heard before one may be deprived of a significant property interest. 41 The procedures that satisfy due process vary with the
importance of the interests involved and the nature of the sub40 395 U.S. 337,339-40 (1969). See note 102 infra.
41

Id. at 343.

42 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
43 397 U.S. 254 at 269 (1970).
44 Id. at 270.
45 401 U.S. 371 (1970).
4G CONN. GEN. STAT. §52-259.
41 401 U.S. at 380-81.
48

Id. at 379.
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sequent proceedings.49 Thus, the state may not, consistent with
the fourteenth amendment, pre-empt the right to dissolve a
marriage by failing to afford all citizens the means the courts
have prescribed for such action.50
Most recently, the Court in Bell v. Burson 1 extended Sniadach and fortified the judicial attack on statutes violating procedural due process by holding that the petitioner was deprived
of due process by the Georgia Motor Vehicle Statute,'12 which
allowed the suspension of a driver's license without a hearing. 3
Affirming the principles espoused in Sniadach and Goldberg, the
Court reasoned that due process will only be satisfied if the
statutory inquiry is limited to a determination of whether there
may be a reasonable possibility of judgment in the amount
claimed against the licensee.'5
Thus, a hearing was required,
since the taking of the license without such was a deprivation
of property within the purview and protection of the fourteenth
amendment.5 ,
ANALYSIS OF FUENTES V. SHEVIN

Post Sniadach Decisions and Due Process
In the wake of Sniadach, summary procedural methods
came under judicial attack throughout the country. Applying

the reasoning of Sniadach, many courts construed the decision as setting forth general principles of procedural due
process. For example, the replevin statutes of two states were
declared unconstitutional, since they did not provide vendees
with notice and a hearing before repossession. 56 Prejudgment
Id. at 378.
Id. at 383.
51 402 U.S. 535 (1971).

49

50

52 Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, GA. CODE ANN.
92A-601
ct seq. (1958).
-5:1402 U.S. at 542.
54 402 U.S. at 540.
, Id. at 543.
• 'Just four months after the decision in Goldberg, the New York
Court of Appeals in Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp.
716 (D.C.N.Y. 1970) held that the statute permitting the prejudgment
seizure of chattels without an order of a judge or court was constitutionally
defective. It was determined that, "beds, stoves, mattresses, dishes, tables
and other necessities such as the wages in Sniadach, were a 'specialized type
of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system,' the taking
of which on the unilateral command of an adverse party may impose tremendous hardships on purchasers of these essentials." Id. at 722. Bypassing
the question of equal protection and recognizing that the defendant can obtain possession pending trial by posting bond, the court found that he would
be deprived of the use and enjoyment of his property for a minimum of
four days, and more likely for a longer period. Id. at 723. The court further
found that "lack of refrigeration, cooking facilities and beds create hardships, it would seem, equally as severe as the temporary withholding of onehalf of Sniadach's pay; and measured by Sniadach, the hardships imposed
cannot be considered as minimus."
The Laprease decision stands for the principle that while the defendant
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procedures for the garnishment of accounts receivable were
might have been able to reclaim the property by posting a bond, the amount
of which had been fixed by his adversary, the fact remains that the debtor
was already deprived of his property possibly without notice and an opportunity to be heard. No facts indicating special circumstances were presented to a judicial officer to justify a concept of due process that would
allow the elimination of the right to be heard.
In Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242 (1971), the California
claim and delivery statute (similar to replevin) was attacked on the ground
that it violated constitutional due process. Relying heavily on the rationale
in Sniadach, the court held:
Like wage garnishments, the execution of claim and delivery process involves a taking of property. Indeed, in claim and delivery cases, the
taking is the obvious physical removal of personal property. This deprivation of property is a taking even though the defendant may later recover his property if he prevails at the ultimate trial on the merits and
even though the plaintiff must post a bond. In his concurring opinion in
Sniadach, Justice Harlan clearly pointed out that the 'property' of
which petitioner has been deprived is the use of the garnished portion
of her wages during the interim period between the garnishment and the
culmination of the main suit ... Similarly, the 'property' of which a defendant is deprived by execution of claim and delivery process is the use
of the disputed goods between their seizure and the final judgment.
Neither the eventual recovery of the property nor the posting of a bond
remedies this loss of the use of the property pending final judgment.
482 P.2d at 1257. The court was faced with the problem of whether the
debtor waived his constitutional rights by a clause signed by him in the
conditional sales agreement. In answering this problem in the negative,
the court held that the mere fact that such clauses are exacted in many
cases cannot render constitutional the claim and delivery law which deprives
alleged debtors of their right to due process whether or not such purported
waiver has been signed. Id. at 1259.
A second California decision made an even stronger attack upon summary repossession of property. In Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.
Cal. 1972), the terms of the security agreement provided that should the
debtor fail to make payment of any part of the principal or interest as provided in the promissory note, the secured party would have all the rights

and remedies of a secured party under the California

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

or other applicable law, and all rights and remedies should, to the
extent permitted by law, be cumulative. The issue then presented in this
CODE,

case was whether section 9-503 of the

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

was con-

stitutionally defective on the grounds of due process.
The court held that the logic of Sniadach.should be controlling:
[T]he great weight of authority, both state and federal, has taken a
broader approach, seeing in Sniadach not a special constitutional rule
for wages, but a return of the 'entire domain of prejudgment remedies
to the long standing procedural due process principal which dictates that
except in extraordinary circumstances, an individual may not be deprived of his life, liberty, or property without notice and hearing.'
Id. at 618.

Provisions such as section 9-503 of the

UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL CODE

might lead to the repossession of property not specified in the conditional
sales agreement. This is particularly true where the subjects of the seizure
are vehicles which may have other items stored inside. Therefore, the Adams
court recognized even if the security agreement did work a valid waiver of
the rights to pre-seizure notice and hearing with regard to the named
collateral, no such assumption could be made as to the extraneous items and,
therefore, the denial of due process is self-evident. Id. at 621. In Sniadach,
the court limited itself to wages by stating it was a "specialized type of
property presenting distinct problems in our economic system." Other courts
have interpreted "specialized type of property as referring to those goods
which, in some vaguely defined way are essential to the maintenance of dayto-day existence." The security interests covered by the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §9-503 may be the essential items necessary for day-to-day
existence, household appliances, furniture, and automobiles, all of which may
be considered necessities. Therefore, for this reason alone, section 9-503
of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE fails to meet the test established by
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declared unconstitutional,5 7 as well as statutes in two states
which did not provide for a hearing before subjecting a boarder's personal property to an innkeeper's lien.58 A Pennsylvania
confession of judgment procedure, 59 a regulation authorizing
the seizure and retention of money found on the person of a
hospital patient for hospital expenses,6 0 and an act giving a
landlord a unilateral right to levy on his tenant's property for
rent due, 1 were all found to be violative of the principles prescribed in Sniadach. The denouncement of the Wisconsin garnishment law provoked similar demands for notice and hearing
requirements in other states,6 2 as well as in such previously unquestioned areas as warehousemen's liens,6 3 repossessions of
real property, 4 extrajudicial mortgage foreclosures,6 5 attachments of real estate, 6 summary imprisonment for non-appearance at disclosure proceedings,6 dismissal of civil service em70
ployees, 6 landlord liens,6 9 and distraints for rent.
However, some courts limited the Sniadach decision
by holding that it did not prescribe general principles of due
process; consequently, Sniadach was strictly construed and its
reasoning was not extended to summary replevin actions. 1 For
the Sniadach court and is therefore constitutionally defective; thus, it
held illegal. Id. at 621.

must

be

5 Arnold v. Knettle, 10 Ariz. App. 509, 460 P.2d 45 (1969); Jones
Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Services, Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87
(1970).
58 Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970) ; Collins v. Viceroy
Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. 11. 1972). The Collins case will be
analyzed in more detail later in this article.
59 Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 405 U.S.
191 (1972).
60 McConaghley v. New York, 60 Misc. 2d 825, 304 N.Y.S.2d 136 (1969).
61 Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
62 See, e.g., McMeans v. Schwartz, 330 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D. Ala. 1971);
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Conn. 1970), rev'd,
405 U.S. 538 (1972); Arnold v. Knettle, 10 Ariz. App. 509, 460 P.2d 45
(1969) ; Randone v. Appellate Dept., 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13 (1971);
McCallop v. Carberry, 1 C.3d 903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1970);
Lucas v. Stapp, 497 P.2d 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972) ; Larson v. Featherston,
44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969). See generally Michelman, The Supreme
Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7, 113-18 (1969); Note, Constitutional
Law - Prejudgment Attachment and Garnishment - The Progeny of the
Sniadach-Kelly Marriage, 49 N. CAR. L. REv. 763 (1971).
63 Magro v. Lentini, 338 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
64 Hutcherson v. Lehtin, 313 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D. Cal. 1970) ; Velazquez
v. Thompson, 321 F. Supp. 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
65 Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 130,8 (D.D.C. 1970).
I0 Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971);
Robinson v. Loyola Foundation, Inc., 236 So. 2d 154 (Fla. App. 1970).
67 Desmond v. Hachey, 315 F. Supp. 328 (S.D. Me. 1970).
6l Ricucci v. United States, 425 F.2d 1252 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
69 Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
7o Sellers v. Contino, 327 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Santiago v.
McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
71 See Reeves v. Motor Contract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971);
Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971) ; American Olean Tile Co. v. Zimmerman, 317 F. Supp. 150 (D. Hawaii 1970);
Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970); Termplan, Inc. v. Su-
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example, in Brunswick v. J. and P., Inc.,12 the prejudgment
repossession of certain bowling equipment was upheld on the
ground that the conditional sales contracts involved authorized
such procedure. Sniadach was distinguished because:
• .. [it] expressly was a unique case involving a 'specialized type of
property presenting distinct problems in our economic system.'
That case [Sniadach] involved wage garnishment without notice or
hearing . . . It is not in the least comparable to the case here on
7
appeal involving enforcement of a security interest. 3

The court reasoned that since the appellants had agreed that
the creditor could enter upon default to recover the collateral,

witlt or without process, they could not complain after they did
in fact default. 74 In McCormick v. First National Bank,7 it
was recognized that since the conditional sales contract in issue
provided the seller with all of his Uniform Commercial Code
rights on default, including section 9-503, there was no violation of due process when the seller summarily repossessed his
security.76
The argument that New Jersey's summary repossession
statutes violated due process was rejected in Almor Furniture
v. MacMillan.7 7 The court determined that although the defendant's arguments were persuasive, the security provisions of
section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code should not be
jeopardized by a sudden unconstitutional declaration of one of
7 8
the remedies relied upon by sellers in security transactions.
The rules and practices of a Baltimore city court in replevin actions were held not to be violative of due process in
Wheeler v. Adams Company. 9 The defendants had bought
certain household items pursuant to a conditional sales conperior Court of Maricopa County, 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969);
Michael's Jewelers v. Handy, 6 Conn. Cir. 103, 266 A.2d 904 (1969); Mills
v. Bartlett, 265 A.2d 39 (Del. Super. 1970).
72424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970).
73 Id. at 105.
14 It
should be pointed out that in Brunswick both the debtor and creditor were commercial parties familiar with conditional sales contracts and the
clauses therein, while in Fuentes the debtors were private individuals unfamiliar with such contracts. This difference will be important in a later discussion on effective waiver of constitutional rights on the part of the buyer.
It should also be pointed out that the goods involved in Brunswick were industrial (bowling equipment), while those involved in Fuentes were of a
household nature.
75322 F. Supp. 604 (D.C. Fla. 1971).
76 d. at 605.
77 116 N.J. Super. 65, 280 A.2d 862 (1971).
78116 N.J. Super. 69, 280 A.2d 864. The court also reasoned that although replevin was originally designed to test title of property associated
with different goods (e.g., wagons, logs, timber), it has today become part of
our system of financing on the basis of secured interest and installment payment plans. Thus, the court declined to declare unconstitutional the New
Jersey replevin statute.
79322 F. Supp. 645 (D.C. Md. 1971), prob. jur. noted, 401 U.S. 906
(1970).
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tract; the vendors repossessed, as they did in Fuentes, by
writ of replevin. The court held that the seizure of chattels
before a hearing was necessary to protect the rights of the
vendor and prevent an undue burden, rendering the replevin
remedy ineffective and curtailing credit selling. The court
placed great emphasis on the fact that the rights of the purchaser were adequately safeguarded by the city's court proceedings, 80 such protections including: 1) the burden of the vendor to make a prima facie showing to the judge that he was entitled to the writ; 2) the requirement that the vendor post a
bond; and 3) the possibility
that the vendee could retain the
8
bond.
goods by posting

The Florida replevin statute was upheld in the district
court decision of Fuentes v. Fairloth,82 which extended the
reasoning of Brunswick to cases involving consumer goods. The
court recognized that hardships facing welfare recipients and
those persons whose wages are garnished were not present in the
case of the sale of a gas stove and stereo. The court concluded that despite Sniadach and Goldberg, there remained
certain situations where, if the seller repossessed in order to
protect his security interest, the prejudgment seizure of goods
83
without a hearing would be valid.
In Epps v. Cortese,84 the arguments in favor of replevin
80 The creditor in Wheeler contended that the Maryland replevin process
commences with an ex parte judicial order which is not issued until the seller
establishes a prima facie case of its right to possession; that the effectiveness
of the replevin remedy would often be paralyzed by notice to a purchaser in
advance of seizure since such notice would enable him to move or secrete
the chattels sought; and that an indigent may, if he or she cannot obtain a
retorno habendo bond, obtain an accelerated People's Court trial. Therefore, the replevin procedure was not violative of due process. In agreeing
with the above arguments the court held:
[T]he contention that surprise and therefore seizure before a hearing is
necessary to protect the interests of the seller, replevin plaintiff, cannot
be dismissed as frivolous. The People's Court requirement of ex parte
judicial consideration only, prior to the issuance of a writ of replevin,
must be considered against that background. Plaintiffs contend that, at
least in the absence of a showing by a seller who is a replevin plaintiff
that there is a specific reason to believe that a purchaser (replevin defendant) will conceal or dispose of the goods sought to be replevied if
the replevin seizure is not carried out without prior notice, any practice
which provides only for an ex parte hearing prior to seizure falls short
of both constitutional due process and search and seizure standards. But
seemingly there will be few instances in which a seller who is a wouldbe replevin plaintiff will be able to allege sufficient specific information
about a given purchaser to support the probability that that purchaser
will hide or dispose of goods which the seller desires to replevy. Thus,
applying in a civil replevin setting, standards approximating the probable cause requirements of the criminal law .

.

. seem unrealistic.

322 F. Supp. 657 (citations omitted).
81 322 F. Supp. at 658, prob. jur. noted, 401 U.S. 906 (1970).
82 317 F. Supp. 954 (D.C. Fla. 1970), prob. jur. noted 401 U.S. 906
(1970).
83 Id. at 957.
84 326 F. Supp. 127 (D.C. Pa. 1971), prob. jur. noted 402 U.S. 954 (1970).
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statutes were espoused with special clarity. The court distinguished Sniadach on the ground that wages were more than
mere property of the garnishee; rather, they were needed to
buy the necessities of life, unlike the rings, stereo sets, and diamond watches involved in the case at bar. 5 Further, in
Sniadach the creditor sought property in which he had no title,
while here the vendor retained title to the property. 6 Sniadccch and Goldberg were read in light of their particular facts,
and were held not to have declared the general remedy
of replevin unconstitutional. Consequently, the court reasoned
that since there was no irreparable harm suffered similar to
that in Sniadach and Goldberg, and since there was no finality

of taking by the sheriff in the replevin repossession action, the
vendee's right to procedural due process was not violated.87 A
preliminary hearing, the court continued, might adversely affect both future commercial transactions and the continuation
of retail credit, since the creditor would be denied an adequate
and practical remedy for repossession. s Further, it was recognized that the summary repossession procedure substantially
conserved state financial resources by reducing the number of
hearings in a lawsuit. Finally, if the replevin action was subsequently found to be in bad faith, the vendee could be "made
whole" by the forfeiture of the plaintiff's bond.89 For these
reasons, the court concluded that preliminary hearings in replevin were not required.
Due Process, Replevin, and Fuentes v. Shevin
The Court in Fuentes stated: "the central meaning of due
S5M. at 133. The Epps court held:
[B]ecause wages have no substitute and because they are each day used
to obtain and meet the needs of that day, they are quite unlike the property here involved - stereo sets, rings, diamond watches, tables, stools
and bed. The debtor can temporarily live without such property while its
owner seeks its return in kind. In Sniadach, the creditor sought property
to which he had no title and which, because of its unique character, was
an irreplaceable necessity to the debtor. In contrast, the creditor here
(plaintiff in the replevin suit) seeks specifically identifiable property to
which he has reserved title and which he now seeks in order to prevent
its loss, concealment or destruction. To eliminate a summary remedy
which permits immediate repossession of secured property, may well
limit an aggrieved creditor to a worthless judgment with the attendant

legal expense of obtaining it.

Sniadach involved a seizure grounded in a

collateral claim on a promissory note where the creditor utilizing the
garnishment procedure had no colorable interest whatsoever in the debtor's wages, nor any interest in protecting or preserving his own property. The situation in Sniadach, therefore, is readily distinguishable...
86 Id. It is submitted that this case is by far the best reasoned case of
the post Sniadach opinions which refused to extend due process protections to
summary repossession replevin actions. The court noted that several post
Sniadach opinions had extended the due process protections to replevin but
the court plainly stated its disagreement with these cases.
87 Id. at 134.
88 Id. at 136.

89 Id. at 135-6.
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process has been clear. Parties whose rights are to be affected
are to be heard; and so to protect that right they must be notified." 0 Applying this broad statement to due process, the
Court held that the prejudgment replevin statutes of Pennsylvania and Florida violated this principle because no notice or
hearing was given to vendees when their "property" was repossessed.0 ' A hearing is required after the goods are repossessed, but neither a later hearing nor damage award can alter
the fact that there could have been an "arbitrary taking" by
the vendor.92 Although a plaintiff-vendor is required to post
bond and thus subject himself to liability if the goods are not
his own, the Court, while impliedly rejecting the reasoning of
Wheeler and Epps, reasoned that nothing more than the applicant's personal belief in his rights were tested by the bond requirements. 3 Since a vendor's private gain was at stake, the
mere deterrent of posting bond was not a substitute for consti4
tutional due process.
Noting the holding in Epps, that the vendees were not
deprived of due process because the taking was not final, the
Fuentes Court reasoned that the possessory interests of the
vendees in those chattels were within the protection of the
fourteenth amendment. Relying heavily on Sniadach and Bell,
the Court held that, "it is now well settled that a temporary,
nonfinal deprivation of property is nonetheless a deprivation in
terms of the fourteenth amendment."9 5 Wheeler was impliedly
rejected as the Court concluded that the mere posting of security
by the defendant to regain the repossessed property was not a
substitute for due process. 6 Reviewing the Epps arguments
that the vendees did not have a property interest because they
lacked title, the Court concluded that Boddie, Bell, and Goldberg
should be extended to any significant property interest. As in
90 407 U.S. 67 at 80. To support this position on due process, the Supreme Court cited 18 cases including:
Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly,
379 U.S. 254 (1970) ; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ; Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 309 (1950) ; Opp Cotton Mills v. Adm'r
312 U.S. 126 (1941); Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223 (1864).
It appears that the extent to which procedural due process must be afforded
depends on whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that loss outweighs
Joint Anti-Fascist
the government's interest in summary adjudication.
(Frankfurter,
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)
J., concurring); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886, 895 (1961) ; Noble State Bank v. Haskel, 219 U.S. 104, 110 (1911).
1" 407 U.S. at 83.
92
Id. at 81-2.
93 Id.
at 83.
94 Id. at 83-4.
05 Id. at 84-5.
98 Id. at 85.
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Sniadach, the appellants were deprived of an interest in the
continued use and possession of the goods until trial; consequently, that interest was entitled to protection under the fourteenth amendment. Even if it were proven at the preliminary
hearing that the appellants had in fact defaulted, such would not
be a valid excuse to prevent a hearing."7
As previously mentioned, Epps, Brunswick, and the district
court decision of Fuentes all held that the due process safeguards of Sniadach did not apply unless the chattels were "absolute necessities of life."9 8 The court in Fuentes reasoned,
however, "that while Sniadach and Goldberg emphasized the
special importance of wages and welfare benefits, they did not
convert that emphasis into a new and more limited constitutional doctrine."9 9 This fact was made clear in Bell, since the
driver's license was obviously considered not to be a necessity
"in the same light that wages were in Sniadach."100° Thus, the
household goods in this case were held to be included within the
protections outlined in Boddie, Sniadach, and Bell. Since the

fourteenth amendment applies to "property" generally, 1°1 the
distinction between necessities and luxuries is without foundation in applying the safeguards of due process.
Finally, the Fuentes Court noted the argument of Sniadach
that under certain extraordinary conditions, both a notice and
hearing would not be required before dispossession. However,
the Court reasoned that the facts at bar did not constitute any
102
of the extraordinary circumstances outlined.

The dissent of Mr. Justice White considered the seller's
97Id. at 87.
08 Id. at 88.
"9 Id. at 88-89.
100 Id. at 89.
10 Id. at 90.

102 The following cases upheld the validity of summary seizure methods: The seizure of a mislabeled food supplement was upheld because
public health outweighed private interest. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950). Similarly in dealing with contaminated
food. North American Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908). Such
governmental or public interest were also held to outweigh private interests in the collection of government revenue. Phillips v. Commissioner,
283 U.S. 589, 596 (1931) ; aiding the national war effort, Central Union
Trust Co. v. Garavan, 254 U.S. 554, 566 (1921) ; Stoer v. Wallace, 255 U.S.
239, 245 (1921) ; United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547, 553 (1921) ; and in
the prevention of a bank failure through summary seizure of the bank's assets under the Fed. Home Loan Bank Administration Act of 1936. Fahey
v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947). Other instances of the approval of summary procedures by the Supreme Court have been; administrative price
and rent controls in time of war, Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 521
(1944) ; suspension of an exemption from stock registration. R. A. Holman
& Co. Inc. v. Sec. Exch. Comm'r, 299 F.2d 127, 132 (D.C. Cir. 1962) cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962) ; and dismissal of a defense employee, Cafeteria
& Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
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interest in any default-replevin proceeding, 10 3 arguing:
If there is a default, it would seem not only fair, but essential,
that the creditor be allowed to repossess; and . . . the likelihood
of a mistaken claim of default is sufficiently real or recurring to
justify a creditor do
more than typical state law requires and
04
permits him to do.1
The dollars and cents considerations of the vendor, stated the
dissent, weigh heavily against false claims of default. Thus,
the dissent reasoned that the prejudgment hearing is unneces0
sary. 1
Justice White stated that Goldberg, Sniadach, and Bell did
not initiate inflexible procedures which must be adopted to
every type of repossession. 10
Further, the dissent argued that
the creditor's interest in preventing further use of his chattel
after default was completely ignored by the majority.107 At
the very least, the vendee's right to possession should be dependent upon the making of a payment into court. 0 8 The dissent reasoned that the requirement of a prejudgment hearing
would do little to protect the rights of a debtor since this right
could be waived, and further, if a hearing is required, the vendor would merely establish probable cause by showing that a
default had occurred.' 0 9 Moreover, as originally argued in
Epps, the dissent recognized that the availability of credit to
poor buyers may also be diminished.
Finally, the Uniform Commercial Code, which so persuasively governs the subject matter, was not revised when
the new edition was published in 1971. The editorial board refused to change the wording of section 9-503 which provided
for summary repossession methods. Therefore, the dissent
reasoned that section 9-503 of the UCC should not be held
unconstitutional,"0 and adopted the reasoning of Epps, McCor'03 In the vigorous dissent, Justices White, Burger, and Blackmun rejected the majority opinion in the following manner:
1. It goes without saying that in the typical installment sale of
personal property both seller and buyer have interests in the property
until the purchase price is fully paid, the seller early in the transaction
often having more at stake than the buyer.
2. Neither is it disputed that the buyer's right to possession is
conditioned upon his making the stipulated payments and that upon
default the seller is entitled to possession.
3. There is no question in these cases that if default is disputed
by the buyer he has the opportunity for a full hearing and that if he
prevails he may have the property or its full value as damages.

407 U.S. at 99.
104407 U.S. at 100
105 Id. at 100.
106 Id. at 101.

107

Id. at 102.

108 Id.

Id. at 102-03. See p. 155 infra.
110 Id at 103.
109
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mick, and Almor Furniture in an attempt to sustain the validity

of the section.
Waiver of Due Process

The Supreme Court held in Fuentes that the contract signed
by Mrs. Fuentes did not waive her right to a probable cause
hearing prior to repossession. 1 ' The situation in Fuentes was

distinguished from a prior decision of the Court in D. H. Ovcrmyer Co. v. Freck

Co.1 1 2

Fuentes recognized that Overmyer had

held that the contractual waiver of due process had been made
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.1
Further, the Overmyer case was not a situation involving unequal bargaining
power or overreaching because both parties were aware of the

significance of the waiver provision. In Fuentes, however:
[t]here was no bargaining over contractual terms between the
parties who, in any event, were far from equal bargaining
power. The purported waiver provision was a printed part of a
form sales contract and a necessary condition of sale.

The appel-

lees made no showing whatever that the appellants were actually
aware or made aware of the significance of the 1 fine
print now
4
relied upon as a waiver of constitutional rights.'

Thus, the contract clause in Mrs. Fuentes' agreement was

no more than a statement of the rights of the seller to repossess under certain circumstances. Unlike the situation in
Overmyer, the contract provision was simply not a "voluntary
and knowing waiver" of her constitutional right to a pre-seizure hearing. 1 5
1
407 U.S. 67 at 96.
112 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
11 407 U.S. at 95.

114 Id. In the Overmyer case, 405 U.S. 174 (1972), the petitioner, D. H.
Overmyer Co., Inc. and respondent Frick Co., entered into a construction
contract. After Overmyer failed to meet the progress payments due, Frick
discontinued its work and filed mechanic's liens against the property. Subsequently, Overmyer executed a promissory note in consideration of Frick's
agreement to complete the work and to forego enforcement of the liens.
After the work was completed and accepted, Overmyer again requested
and was granted additional time to pay. After negotiation, Overmyer executed a new note to replace the first, and Frick agreed to release the mechanic's liens. The new note, however, contained a confession of judgment
clause. Claiming a breach of the contract by Frick, Overmyer ceased
making payments on the second note and Frick caused judgment to be confessed for the balance then due. Overmyer moved to vacate the judgment,
averring deprivation of his procedural due process right to notice and a
hearing before judgment. After an appellate court and the Supreme Court
of Ohio had rejected Overmyer's constitutional claim, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court affirmed but made it clear that it did so only because
the facts proved that Overmyer, a corporation, was fully aware of the
significance of the cognovit note which was part of the consideration for
Frick's agreement to extend the pay period. The Court held that Overmyer
had "voluntarily. intelligently and knowingly waived the rights it otherwise
possessed to prejudgment notice and hearing. . .

."

405 U.S. 174 (1972).

1- 407 U.S. 67 at 96 (1972).
There was no waiver because the contract provision itself said nothing about waiver but only that the seller
"may take back" his merchandise in the event of default.
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Although Fuentes prescribed broad standards of procedural
due process for the protection of vendees, it appears that such
can be waived by appropriate contract clauses.116 The Supreme
Court, in several pre-Fuentes decisions, set forth the requirements necessary to waive procedural due process protections.
Waiver has been defined as an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege.1 1 7 A valid waiver
must be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made." 8 In
determining whether rights have been waived, much depends
on the facts and circumstances surrounding each case including the background, experience, and conduct of the individual." 9
Although the parties may agree to waive certain rights in
advance,'12 0 courts indulge in every presumption against the
21
waiver of due process rights.

Several Illinois courts have also used similar requirements2
to determine whether due process rights have been waived.2
For example, in Scott v. Danaher,1 23 the district court held that
an alleged waiver must be examined in light of the well-settled
presumption against the waiver of a constitutional right. The
court further held that whether the execution by a debtor of a
cognovit clause in a promissory note amounts to an understanding and voluntary waiver of the debtor's constitutional
right to notice and hearing upon subsequent confession of
judgment and garnishment of his assets is a fact issue which
must be resolved in each individual case; turning upon such
circumstances as the debtor's intelligence, state of mind, education, and bargaining power at the time of the execution of
I", See note 139 infra.
117 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1937).
'll Id.; Swarb v. Lennox, 92 S. Ct. 767 (1972).
119 D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972); Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1969) ; Brookhard v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1
(1966).
120 National Equipment Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 at 316 (1964).
121 Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937);
Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408 (1882).
The presumption against waiver
holds true in criminal cases as well. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337
(1970) ; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
See also Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
22 To waive a right one must have knowledge of that right and a clear
intention to waive it must be proved by precise and unequivocal evidence.
Klim v. Johnson, 16 Ill. App. 2d 484, 148 N.E.2d 333 (1958); Muller v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 293 Ill. App. 555, 13 N.E.2d 96 (1938) ; Acme
Feeds, Inc. v. Daniel, 312 Ill. App. 330, 38 N.E.2d 530 (1941) ; Perin v.
Parker, 126 111. 201, 18 N.E. 747 (1888). The criterion to determine waiver
is not solely the language employed, but is a combination of that articulation and the surrounding circumstances. People v. Landgham, 122 Ill. App.
2d 9, 257 N.E.2d 484 (1970) ; Kaplan's Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 16 Ill. App. 2d
541, 149 N.E.2d 113 (1958). The burden of proof is upon the party claiming
the waiver; to prove that he was aware of the right's existence and his
entitlement to it. Home Indem. Co. of N.Y. v. Allen, 190 F.2d 490 (1951) ;
Ferrero v. Knights of Security, 309 Ill. 476, 141 N.E. 130 (1923) ; Garvy v.
Blatchford Calif. Meal Co.. 119 F.2d 973 (1941).
123 343 F.
Supp. 1272 at 1277-78 (N.D. Ill. 1972). Note 143 infra.
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the note. It is obvious that a layman may have difficulty in
comprehending both the meaning of terms and the legal ramifications which flow from the execution of a document containing a cognovit clause.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF FUENTES

The most direct consequence of Fuentes v. Shevin in Illinois has been that parts of the replevin statute now have
questionable validity as to summary repossession.
Sections
4 to 7, which describe summary application and repossession
pursuant to the replevin statute, are now most likely unconstitutional,124 although the remaining sections appear
sound.1 25 As previously noted, Fuentes was not a constitutional bar against the repossession by replevin of the seller's
collateral; rather, only statutes which provided for summary
notes 30-32 supra.
The Illinois legislature may do well to follow the lead of New York.
After the New York Replevin statute was declared unconstitutional as
violative of due process in Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co. 315 F. Supp.
716 (1970), the New York legislature enacted the following statutes:
CPLR 7102 (d) 1 (1971);
Order of seizure. 1. Upon presentation of the affidavit and undertaking and upon such terms as may be required to conform to the
due process of law requirements of the fourteenth amendment to
the constitution of the United States, the court shall grant an order
directing the sheriff of any county where the chattel is found to
seize the chattel described in the affidavit and including, if the court
so directs, a provision that, if the chattel is not delivered to the
sheriff, he may break open, enter and search for the chattel in the
place where the chattel may be.
CPLR 7102 (d) 2 (1971);
If the order of seizure does not include the provision permitted by
paragraph one of this subdivision, the court shall grant a restraining
order that the chattel shall not be removed from the state if it is
a vehicle, aircraft or vessel or, otherwise, from its location, transferred, sold, pledged, assigned or otherwise disposed of or permitted
to become subject to a security interest or lien until further order
of the court. Unless the court otherwise directs, the restraining
order does not prohibit a disposition of the chattel to the plaintiff.
Disobedience of the order may be punished as contempt of court.
CPLR 7102 (d) 1 leaves the determination of whether to afford the
debtor notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to seizure in the
discretion of the trial judge. This statute has been held to be constitutional on its face. CPLR 7102 (d) 2 operates to permit the trial judge
to restrain the sale, removal, or encumbrance of the goods if not seized
per paragraph one above. Nonetheless, it appears that the considerations of the type of property and the balancing of interests must weigh
heavily in favor of the creditor for seizure to be ordered without prior
notice or hearing being allowed the debtor. Perhaps only where it
appears uncontroverted that the creditor is about to suffer an irreversible
harm should seizure be allowed before notice or an opportunity to be
heard is afforded the debtor. Despite the finding that CPLR 7102 (d) 1
is constitutional on its face, the question is by no means settled. Certainly, under such a broadly drawn statute, each case presents a new
opportunity for a constitutional challenge under its particular facts.
Until further legislation and/or judicial interpretation, it appears that
the issuance of an injunction prohibiting removal, sale or encumbrance
of the goods, as per CPLR 7102 (d) 2, with a subsequent action in
detinue, is the best balance of the creditor's and debtor's rights available
in most jurisdictions.
124 See

125
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repossession by vendors without a prior hearing were forbidden .

2

On the basis of the Fuentes decision, the Circuit Court of
Cook County on August 24, 1972, added the following paragraph to the general orders which deal with replevin actions:
REPLEVIN AND GARNISHMENT ACTIONS
(a) The Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County shall not
accept actions in replevin for filing and shall not issue writs of
replevin.
(b) The Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County shall not
accept an affidavit for a non-wage garnishment and shall refuse
to issue summons in such proceeding based upon a judgment by
confession
unless such judgment is confirmed after service of
1 2
process.

1

In connection with the order, the office of the state's attorney has issued an opinion addressed to the Clerk of the
Circuit Court of Cook County, which includes the following:
*

.

. the strong language of both the Scott and Fuentes cases leads

to the inescapable conclusion that non-wage garnishments without prior notice and an opportunity for a hearing are no longer
legally permissible. These recent cases are illustrative of judicial
interest in affording notice and an opportunity for hearing prior
to depriving an individual of his property. It is my opinion that
your office refuse to accept affidavits for non-wage garnishments
and you should further refuse to issue summons 1in28 such proceedings based upon judgments by mere confession.
As a result of Fuentes, section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which provides a secured party on default
the right to take possession of his collateral without judicial
12 9
process, appears to have been impliedly held unconstitutional.
As previously discussed, the courts in Almor Furniture, Wheeler, and Epps were hesitant to declare section 9-503 unconstitutional because of the adverse implications on conditional vendor security. Although the majority in Fuentes never reached
this argument, the dissent reasoned that the failure of the
Uniform Commercial Code's Editorial Board to revise section
9-503 was substantial impetus for sustaining the validity of
prejudgment replevin statutes. 130 The effect of Fuentes will
necessarily be to limit the conditional vendor's right of "self
help" in repossessing his chattel, pursuant to section 9-503, in
the event of default. Judicial process is now probably necessary
for a conditional vendor to repossess, and the due process safe" See p. 144 supra.

127 General order of the Circuit Court of Cook County, section 6.4

(Aug. 24, 1972).
128 State's Attorney Legal Opinion No. 1425.
129 Note 3 supra.
130

407 U.S. 67 at 103.
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guards of Sniadach will certainly be effective to require a prejudgment hearing.
One apparent weakness of the Fuentes opinion is the lack
of direction concerning the person or persons to conduct the
probable cause hearing. There is some indication in the opinion, however, that the sheriff may be the officer who should
preside, since he is the one who would eventually repossess the
goods for the seller. Another weakness concerns the rights
of the vendor and vendee at the probable cause hearing. Is
there a right to counsel and a right to cross-examination?
What kind of evidence may be introduced at the hearing; and
will any determination by the sheriff at the hearing be subsequently binding?
The decision does, however, afford a few "clues" as to the
form of hearing required. Due process tolerates appropriate
variances in the form of the hearing, dependent upon the nature of the case. 131 The hearing must consider "the importance
of the interests involved, ' 132 matters such as the length and
severity of the deprivation, 133 and the simplicity of the decisive
issues. 3 4 Thus, it is apparent that the required hearing may
vary greatly according to each case. However, legislative action is certainly needed to structure and clarify the form of the
hearing in order to effectively protect a vendee's procedural due
process rights.
A more subtle effect of Fuentes will be its impact on interest rates and vendee credit when chattels are bought "on
time." In the typical consumer credit transaction, a vendor
sells his chattel to the vendee, who contracts to pay in installments; interest is charged on each installment, and title to the
chattel is retained by the vendor as security. Most importantly,
both the terms of the agreement, controlled in Illinois by the
Retail Installment Sales Act, 1 5 and the amount of interest or
finance charge that the vendee must pay, depend on the type
of article sold, the vendee's credit, the amount of the sale, and
the credit and collection practices of the vendor.
131 Id. at 82.
132

Id.

'33

Id. at 86.

Id at 87, n.18.
13 The Retail Installment Sales Act affords vast protection for the
buyer under conditional sales contracts. For excellent discussions on retail
credit transactions, see: Alexander, Fraudulent Installment Sales, 1960, 41.
Chi. Bar Rec. 285 (1960); Mikva, Future Trends in Consumer Credit, 52
Chi. Bar Rec. 355, (1971); Nichols, Illinois Retail Installment Sales Act,
46 ILL. BAR. J. 658 (1958) ; White, Representing the Low Income Consum~er
in Repossessions, Resales, and Deficiency Judgment Cases, 64 Nw. U.L. REV.
808 (1970) ; Berger, The Bill Collector and the Law - a Special Tort, at
Least for a While, 17 DEPAUL L. REV. 327 (1968).
14
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As a result of Fuentes, summary replevin collection practices of conditional vendors were declared unconstitutional.
Consequently, the availability of credit for conditional vendees
may rapidly decline, since the conditional vendor's security has
also diminished. This was essentially the argument presented
in Epps and it would appear that it has some validity, 36 although there is authority to the contrary.' 7 It might be expected that most vendees who were previously "high risks" because of their indigent status might now be denied credit or,
if granted credit, might be charged the maximum finance rates
permissible under the Illinois Retail Installment Sales Act. 138
Thus, potential purchasers who have a questionable financial
status might now find greater difficulty in purchasing both
luxury items and necessities.
The retail vendor also might be affected adversely by the
decision. These sellers might have fewer customers since they
may be forced to charge higher interest rates. Vendors now
have no summary method to repossess chattels in the event of
default and they certainly may be hesitant to sell to a "high
risk" customer, since their property could deteriorate or be
destroyed by the vendee after default and before trial.
The impact of Fuentes may, nevertheless, be obscured
through the use of waiver provisions in future conditional sales
contracts." 9 If the contract provisions satisfy the strict require13 See McGraw and Walsh, Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales,
42 ILL. BAR J. 738, 749-50 (1954). A prior hearing always imposes some
costs in time, money and effort and it is often more efficient to dispense with
the hearing; but the Fuentes Court reasoned that these costs cannot outweigh the constitutional right to a hearing, 407 U.S. at 90, n.22 and at 92,
n.29. A prior hearing may, however, increase disruptions of the debtor's
privacy and increase deficiency judgments against debtors. See White and
Summers, HANDBOOK OF THE UCC 126-6 (1st ed. 1972).
For an excellent discussion on credit and finance charges, see W. MORS,
CONSUMER CREDIT FINANCE CHARGES 75-78 (1965); Johnson, Regulation of
Finance Charges on Cons'umer Installment Credit, 66 MICH. L. REv. 81, 109
(1967); Shay, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: An Economist's View,
54 CORNELL L. REV. 491, 496-97 (1969). Note, An Empirical Study of the
Arkansas Usury Law: "With Friends Like that...

",

1968 U. ILL. L.F.

544, 618-19.
13 4 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 23, 52-62 (1972)
presents an excellent
analysis of the implications of Fuentes. The authors conclude that the
Fuentes requirement for a pre-seizure hearing should have little effect on
the credit policies of finance companies and merchants because of the small
number of repossessions attempted by them each year. It appears that
the high interest rates charged by finance companies and retail merchants
absorb these losses as a business cost.
Further, default occurs only in a small number of the loans made. It
appears that repossession is many times impractical, and where repossession
is practical debtors will probably give up the collateral voluntarily. For
all these reasons, Fuentes will probably have no effect on credit transactions
involving finance companies and merchants.
138 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, §527 (1971).
139 Such provisions may read "In the event I/we default in any of the
obligations, I/we hereby waive notice and hearing and agree that the
collateral may be repossessed." 4 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 23 (1972).
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ments for waiver of due process, the conditional vendee might
waive his right to a pre-seizure hearing. 14° Hence, the conditional vendee may find himself in the same relative position as
before Fuentes. Since the courts have always been rather
skeptical toward waiver provisions, it is possible that many
attempted waivers will not be sustained in future debtor-creditor
situations.'4

Counterbalancing the adverse effects of Fuentes is the
broad standard of fairness and due process which the case proclaims. No longer must a buyer of goods be subjected to unfounded claims of a vendor if he attempts to repossess. A
probable cause hearing is required before a writ of replevin
will issue. Consequently, unfounded harassment of vendees
will probably decrease, provided they continue to pay their vendors when the installments are due. Further, the state will
no longer act in the dark when it issues a replevin writ.
Rather, it now has the opportunity to hear both the vendor and
vendee before ordering the sheriff to replevy the goods. Private parties, serving their own advantage, can no longer unilaterally invoke state power to replevy goods from another.
Following Fuentes, if the probable cause hearing determines
that there was a default, the vendor will recover the chattel.
However, if there is no showing of default, the vendee now has
the right to keep the chattel until a final determination of the
case at trial.
Clearly the Fuentes decision has left other summary remedies of relief constitutionally questionable in Illinois. In Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corporation,42-decided after Sniadach,
but before Fuentes, the court held that the Illinois Innkeeper
Laws, authorizing a hotel proprietor to seize property without
any prior notice or hearing, were constitutionally defective.
Relying on Sniadach, the court reasoned that since the hotel
guests were not granted a hearing at which to contest the
underlying claim, due process was not afforded. As a result,
other statutory lien remedies in Illinois, which do not provide
for a hearing and notice before the lien attaches, may be consti140 See note 139 supra. See also the text discussion of the dissent.

141 The fact is that no party, except one without equal bargaining power,
would ever "voluntarily" sign a provision waiving procedural due process.
In many cases, the creditor will impose unconscionable demands on the
debtor unless a waiver is signed. Courts may view such a waiver provision
as coercive and may not sustain it as a waiver of due process. The "surrounding circumstances" of an attempted waiver by the vendee will be
thoroughly analyzed before a court will sustain any attempted waiver
provision of procedural due process rights. Thus, the courts may continue to
indulge in every presumption against waiver notwithstanding clear provisions
inthe contract.
142 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Il. 1972).
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tutionally defective ;143 and the most noticeable of these being
144
mechanic's hospital liens.
CONCLUSION

In light of the Supreme Court's firm stand against summary repossession methods in Sniadach and Goldberg, the
Fuentes decision is hardly surprising. If the basic presumptions of Sniadach and Goldberg supporting notice and hearing
before dispossession of property are agreed upon, then Fuentes
becomes merely a logical extension of these due process principles to replevin statutes. The argument of several courts in
distinguishing Sniadach on the basis of "necessity" versus "luxury" interests logically "held no water.' '11 5 Sniadach used the

"specialized type of property" argument merely as minor sup-

port for the position that due process was violated. There was
never any attempt to forge a new type of property interest

which was alone entitled to due process protection. Thus, several
courts attempted to infer from Sniadach and Goldberg a distinction which was never intended by the Supreme Court.
In conclusion, there will certainly be some adverse ramifications as a result of Fuentes. However, one thing is now certain: Fuentes has forged new safeguards for buyers under con143

Twelve days prior to the decision in Fuentes, the district court held

in Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp. 1272 (N.D. Ill. 1972), that the Illinois

Garnishment Act, in conjunction with judgments obtained by confession,

violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In the facts
of this case, the plaintiff, William L. Scott, executed an installment sales
contract and judgment note for the purchase of a vacuum cleaner from
Custom King System. The contract and note contained a cognovit clause
which purported to authorize the holder of the note to confess and enter
judgment against the obligor without service of process. After the plaintiff
ceased payment on the note, the creditor confessed judgment against the
plaintiff in the Circuit Court of Cook County. The judgment was obtained
without notice to the plaintiff, in accordance with the applicable state
statute. The creditor, on the basis of the cognovit judgment, directed defendant Danaher, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, to issue a
non-wage garnishment summons against the plaintiff's bank. The first
notice plaintiff received of the garnishment action against him occurred when
his bank advised him that a garnishment summons had been served upon
the bank and that the funds of his account would be frozen pending disposition by court order.
The gravamen of plaintiff's contention was that the procedure encompassed by the Illinois garnishment statute permitted expropriation of property from a debtor without prior notice or an opportunity to be heard on the
merits of the claim either at the time judgment is confessed or at the time
that the garnishment summons is issued.
Again, relying on the logic in Sniadach, the court held that, "it needs
no extended discussion to establish that in the instant case the debtor is
deprived of the use of his property. The fact that the judgment may be
re-opened and the property returned to the plaintiffs does not mitigate
the- fact that the plaintiffs are precluded from the use of their property
for some length of time." Id. at 1275.
144ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 82, §1 et seq. (1971).
145See the discussion of Epps v. Fuentes (lower court decision) and
Brunswick in the text.
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ditional sales contracts by requiring notice and a hearing before replevin writs may issue. Consequently, the decision has
imposed a greater responsibility on the vendor and will certainly prevent unfounded repossession claims in the future.
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